Abstmet-This paper presents a study on the likely h e havior of a daily electricity market proposed to operate in t h e Chilean system. T h e simulation has been carried out by using t h e tool VALORE, able to model oligopolistic behaviors, Conclusions on the desirable degree of longterm contracts are obtained. The thwretical basis of the simulation tool are also explained.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chile has been a pioneering country in the present trend towards electricity systems deregulation [l]. However, perceived deficiencies in the present regulatory framework have induced to the National Regulatory Commission (Ccmisi6n Nacional de la Energia, CNE), as September 2000, to propose a new one.
It was intended for most of the energy to be traded through long-term contracts. However, in order to address imbalances, a short-term (daily) market was also proposed, based on the introduction of a new power exchange system. Its existence has been cause of concern for several analysts, who are afraid of the possibility of anticompetitive behavior in this new market, mostly because of a possible excessive concentration level.
The main purpose of the study reported in this paper is to quantify the likely degree of price distortion to be expected in the new regulatory framework. Reference prices are the theoretical perfect competition ones, currently computed by the independent system operator (CDEC). The used simulation tool (VALORE) models the technical characteristics (maximum power, maximum energy, hydro topology, ...) and costs of the thermal and hydro equipment. It is also able to compute perfect competition and Cournot equilibria (widely considered to be ~~ Cournot equilibria computing algorithms reported in the literature. So, it is possible to study more complex and realistic power system models, as well as performing more simulations in a given time). Section V is the article core: after a brief description of the Chilean system, the performed simulations and their results are explained. In particular, it is quantitatively shown that if there are not significant entry barriers and .the contracting level is high enough, small price distortion should be expected. This information can be useful from a regulatory point of view.
Finally, our conclusions are stated in the last section. The detailed structure of the si.mulation model is explained in the appendix.
CHILEAN NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Chilean Regulatory National Commission (CNE) proposed in 2001 a new reguhtory framework which was based on long-term contracts i.n a free market setting. As stated by the Commission itself [Z]:
_.. being our position that s:xpply and offer market conditions are better represented in medium and long t e r m contracts, and that the agents nnd the whole market medium and long t e r n decisions more (closely approach the optimal resources allocation'.
Therefore, it was proposed that most of the energy to be traded through medium and long term bilateral con--tracts. The Electrical Act proposition [4] includes provisions which obliges to generation and distribution utilities to contract a significant part of the energy that they trade in medium and long term markets. Furthermore, it can I... nuestm posicidn es que las wndiciones de oferta y demanda del meruldo se neflejan mejor en aeuerdos (eontmtos) de mdtano y lorgo plozo, y que lo optimizaeih en la asignacidn de m u r s o s esid mejor mflejoda en las deeisiones de mdiano y largo be argued that there were enough economic incentives for the demand to seek to cover most of its forecasted needs in these markets.
It can be expected that the long-term market behavior approaches that of a perfect competition market. In fact, there are not significant entry barriers, either regulatory or physical ones (the lags involved in new equip ment installation, particularly combined cycle plants and gas turbines, are no longer those of typical medium and long term contracts, being also amortization times much shorter than those of "traditional" power plants).
Actually, in the Chilean Central Interconnected System, electricity spot prices has been falling from 1997, mainly as consequence of the deregulating 1982 Electricty Act and the subsequent instalation of new combined cycle plants. Even more daramatically, in the Chilean North System, an investment glut has been cause of a total installed capacity of more than 3500 MW, being the peak demand 1350 MW. Almost all of the contracts in both cases has been long-term ones.
In any case, it remains the need to provide a mechanism to deal with the short-term fluctuations of the electricity demand over the long and medium term forecasts. So, it was proposed the creation of a daily market, where the energy balancing can be done in a day per day basis.
It is important to note that:
It should be expected that the energy traded in the diary market is going to be a fraction of the total system demand, as most of the energy has been traded by medium and long term contracts.
The prices of the medium and long term contracts are dealt in the corresponding markets, which are supposed to be contestable ones. So, prices in these markets are set by medium and long term conditions, and not by the daily market prices.
OLICOPOLISTIC MARKET BEHAVIOR
The simulation tool tries to compute the market equilibrium, i.e., the set of generation outputs and demanded powers such that no agent has incentives to change his/her operation (in mathematical terms, the Nash equilibrium). It is assumed that each utility tries to maximize its profit.
In equilibrium, for each utility U, the additional cost of producing 1 additional MW-h (marginal cost MC,) should be equal to the additional revenue earned by this
(1) (through all this section, temporal indices will be suppressed in order to keep a simple notation).
Marginal revenue has two components. Firstly, 1 additional MW-h earns the price daily market R. Secondly, because of the increased production, market prices diminishes an amount 6~,. This price fall impacts on all the energy which is being traded in the daily market, which is the difference between the total energy production P, and the energy contracted in long term markets S,. There fore:
(2) (note that 6?r, 5 0, as an offer increase drives to a price fall).
On the other hand, the physical demand D depends on the market price T . Let us assume a linear dependence:
DO and OLD are two parameters which define the demand curve. Although the demand curve is not linear, it is possible to estimate these parameters which define the demand curve linearitation in the neighborhood of the clearing point.
Furthermore, the physical demand-generation balance must be fulfilled:
U
The two last equations jointly imply that:
In order to close the model it is needed to provide some formula for 6~, . The study reported in this paper assumes the scxalled Cozlrnot hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, it is assumed that in the event that any utility changes its production, the remaining utilities keep their production constant. Therefore, if utility U increases its production by 1 MW-h, equation ( 5 ) implies that:
Summarizing, the model solves the system:
Several comments can be done:
1. Although time indices have been suppressed, these equations must be repeated for each period of the simulation time horizon.
2. Marginal cost MC, computation requires the careful modeling of the utilities production means (thermal and hydro plants, reservoirs, etc.), taking into account the intertemporal constraints which limit its operation. This topic, and the way of solving the resulting equations, will be addressed in the next section.
3. The Cournot hypothesis [3] is very often assumed to quantify the limits to oligopolistic distortions, both in electrical [7, 8, 101 and other 13, 5, 61 markets studies. Actually, it should be expected that if any utility decreases its output, the remaining ones will increases theirs, which reduces the price variation 19, 11, 121. Therefore, assuming that the demand behavior remains constant, Cournot prices distortion are a bound to more realistic prices distortions computed taking into account the utilities reactions.
4.
In a perfect competition market, the marginal revenue M R , equals the market price 71, as it is assumed that no utility can significantly influence the clearing price. Formally, this is equivalent to set 1 = 0 in equations (8).
a a
IV. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET SIMULATION BASIS
As in the previous section, temporal indices will be disregarded. However, the detailed model based upon the ideas introduced herein, which incorporates intertempral links, is given in the appendix.
Marginal cost is the derivative of the cost function with respect to the generated power: MC, = e. So, after eliminating M a , equations (7)-(10) can be written as:
dC, 1 --+ -( P u -S , )
It is easy to check that these equations are the KarushKuhn-Tucker first order optimality conditions of the p r o b lem:
being ?r the equality constraint multiplier. Intertemporal links can be introduced in a straightforward way, as shown in the appendix.
Centralized operation, which is theoretically equivalent to perfect market behavior, is the solution of the problem (assuming inelastic demand DO): min E, CU(P,) P" s.t. E, I: = Do (15) Again, the price (which is equal to marginal cost) is the equality constraint multiplier.
V. STUDY CASE

A . Chilean system description
The most important electric system in Chile is the so called Sistema Interconectado Central (Central Interconnected System, SIC for short.), which serves most of the population (about 93%) inchding the nation capital, Santiago. This is the system in .which the reported study is focused.
In 2000, total installed SI12 capacity was 6,653 MW, of which 60.58% was hydro and 39.42% thermal. Peak power was 4,516 MW and total generation 29,577 GWh. System growth has been very fast, of the order of 300 MW/year in the installed capacity for the last 15 years.
There are three main generating utiilities in SIC: Endesa, Gener and Colbun; which own respectively about 57%, 21% and 15% of the total installed capacity.
Given the predominance of the hydraulic component, simulations must take into account intertemporal links related to the hydro operation. Most important system reservoir (Lago Laja) is hyper;innual, with a cycle of about 2 years.
B. Parameters used in the st.'idy 1) Time representation:
Simulation horizon was 4 years, divided in 52 periods of 4 weeks each one. Each period was divided in 2 suhperiods (weekend and working-days), and each subperiod in 3 load levels (peak, off-peak 1 and off-peak 2).
2) Genemtion equipment technical data:
The study has modeled all the significant thermal and hydro units. Thermal unit data include variable: operation costs, maximum power and owner. Hydraulic nnit data includes maximum power, reservoir capacities, hydro system topology (reservoirs and channels), energy mefficients (needed to relate the water volume to the energy is able to generate) and owner. There were also available realistic demand forecasts (they have been historically quite accurate).
3) Hydraulic inflows modebng:
Three hydraulic inflows scenarios have been considered, which are based upon real inflows in the years 1998-1999 (dry), 1982-1983 (wet) and 1974-1975 (medium) . In order to capture the long-term hydraulic system managing, simulations have a 4 years time horizon. First year has inflows corresponding to either the dry, wet o medium year; being the three last years inflows those of the medium year.
4)
Long-ten contracts modeling: Several long-term contracts scenarios were considered. The total amount of contracted power was set to a percentage (95%, 90%, 85%, 75% or 50%) of the total forecast system demand. For each scenario, each utility share in the total contracts volume was the same one than the real share on sold energy one corresponding to the year 2000 (Endesa 53.16%, Gener 24.68%, Colblin 16.10%).
5) Demand curue modeling: The demand response is modeled, for each period, by a line. Therefore, it can be defined by a point on the line an its slope. The point two coordinates are the demanded energy and its price. The energy demanded is the forecast demand, and its price the resulting of a centralized operation.
Three slopes scenarios were considered: 15, 30 and 45 ($/MW-h)/GW. The medium slope implies a demand elasticity of about 0.14. These values are consistent with the ones reported in the literature [13, 8, 91 . In any case, the assumed demand curve is somewhat more inelastic that the reported ones.
C. Method
Firstly, a centralized operation under the medium hydraulic scenario serving the forecasted demand was done. This simulation yields, for each period, subperiod and load level, a price. The pair (demanded energy, price) is assumed to yield in the demand function. As the demand function slope is input data, the demand function can be computed.
Given this function, oligopolistic simulation are performed for each demand and hydraulic scenario. The centralized simulations (equivalent to perfect competition) for each scenario, are also done. Figure 1 show a typical prices output (peak, off-peak 1 and off-peak 2 prices in working and non-working days of each 4-weeks period) for a scenario. Productions of each plant are also computed.
D. Results
The basic results can be summarized in figures 2 and 3.
They show the relationship between the long-term contracts volume and the average price distortion. To quantify this one, the Cost-Price Margin (CPM) Index has been used. The CPM index is defined as:
Market price -Centralized marginal cost Centralized marginal cost CPM Index = Centralized marginal cost should be the market price in a perfect competition market. Therefore, the index should be 0 if the prices were those corresponding to a perfect market.
Actually, the cost and prices used in the CPM Index computation are averaged ones. The average was done with respect to the traded energy during the two first simulation years, in order to represent the short-term market prices distortion. The curves represent the results for dry, medium and wet hydraulic scenarios. For each hydraulic scenarios, low, medium and high demand elasticity cases were studied. The low elasticity demand always corresponds to the highest price distortion when long-term contracts amount by 50% of the demand, whereas the high elasticity demand always corresponds to the lowest price distortion.
It can be observed that if the long-term Contracting is high enough (higher than 85%) prices distortion are quite moderate, specially in the more likely situation of relatively higher elasticity. Note also that CPM Index can be negative, which means that market prices are lower that the perfect competition ones. That happens because some utilities are so heavily contracted that they are net energy short-term market buyers, and therefore have an interest in getting low prices.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A method for the study of the short-term electricity market behavior has been introduced. The method is based in a simulation model able to cope with oligopolistic behavior, in order to study the possible range of price distortion. The method has been applied to quantify the behavior of a proposed short-term market in Chile.
It is shown that if long-term contracting is high enough (higher than 85% in our case), i.e., the short-term market is basically an adjustment market, prices distortion should be small. This conclusion highlights the importance of having competitive and well-regulated long-term markets. The authors think that this is particularly relevant in case of having concentrated markets, in order to bound anticompetitive behavior.
VII. APPENDIX: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION MODEL
Simulation model solves problem (14) considering temporal links and detailed cost structure. Specifically, the optimization model structure is as follows:
A. Time representation
The model scope is divided in periods (weeks or months), denoted as p. Each period is divided in subperiods, denoted as s. A subperiod consists of several load levels, denoted as b. Each level of a subperiod and a period is characterized by its duration: Dbsb auxiliary variable equal to DiBb.
pipsb auxiliary variable equal to Pgab. Pipsb is generated power (pumping consumption excluded) of utility i in level b of subperiod s and period p .
Generated power, as will be shown later, is computed as a linear combination of decision variables.
C. Parameters
-Thermal units are supposed to have constant heat rate:
Ej maximum power generation of thermal unit j.
6 , heat rate of thermal unit j . qj EFOR of thermal unit j.
mjp Maintenance variable. Its value is 0 if thermal unit j is operative during period p and 1 if it is being maintained.
oj Owner utility of thermal unit j -Hydro units are representei as a single group. Every hydro unit has an associated reservoir. Run-off-the-river production is considered separately for each utility.
rmp, E,, maximum and miniinum energy reservoir stor- Comisi6n Nacional de la Energia. Minuta Ezplicativa sobre la Ley General de Senricios Ele'ctricos. Documento para la discusi6n pziblica (in Spanish).
